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Implementing safeguarding and personalisation in social work: 
findings from practice 
250 words Abstract:  
Summary 
This paper reports on part of a research study carried out in three local authority adult 
social care departments in England, which explored links between adult safeguarding and 
personalisation. The study included statistical analysis of data on safeguarding referrals and 
the take up of personal budgets and qualitative interviews with managers, social workers, 
other staff working on safeguarding and with service users. The paper reports the findings 
from 16 interviews with managers and social workers, highlighting their perspectives and 
experiences. 
Findings 
Five main themes emerged from our analysis: contexts and risk factors; views about  risks 
associated with Direct Payments, approaches to minimising risk; balancing risk and choice; 
and weaving safeguarding and personalisation practice. Social workers identified similar 
ranges and kinds of risks to those identified in the national evaluation of Individual Budgets. 
They described a tension between policy objectives and their exercise of discretion to assess 
and manage risks. For example, some described how they would discourage certain people 
from taking their personal budget as a Direct Payment or suggest they take only part of a 
personal budget as a Direct Payment. 
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Application 
This exploratory study supports the continued need for skilled social workers to deliver 
outcomes related to both safeguarding and personalisation policies. Implementing these 
policies may entail a new form of ‘care and control’, which may require specific approaches 
in supervision in order to ensure good practice is fostered and positive outcomes attained.  
 
Keywords:  
Personalisation; Direct Payments; Personal Budgets; Safeguarding; Social Work 
 
Introduction 
Personalisation has been a prominent policy aspiration of the English Department of Health 
(DH) in recent years (DH 2008, Carr, 2012, DH, 2010b). The Care Act 2014 continues this 
policy emphasis, requiring local authorities to offer personal budgets to all those eligible for 
publicly funded social care. However, personalisation is defined in a number of ways. First, it 
may be seen as the creation of support tailored to individual needs, offering greater 
flexibility, choice and control over care and support than traditional services (Carr 2012). It 
has also been argued that personalisation, particularly the use of personal budgets and 
Direct Payments or cash-for-care, reflects a neoliberal agenda of reducing public sector 
expenditure and increasing commercial transactions that offer consumer choice at the 
expense of more universal entitlement and citizenship (Daly, 2012; Lymbery, 2014). 
Furthermore, personalisation has been implemented in the context of means-testing and 
high eligibility thresholds at a time when diminishing numbers of people are receiving local 
authority funded services (Fernandez et al. 2013). This may suggest the individual has to 
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take on more responsibility for the size and shape of care. As Slasberg and Beresford (2015) 
note, this trend leads to substantial unacknowledged unmet need. 
 
However, Needham (2010) cites some research claiming that there is a ‘potential for 
personalization to deliver cost-savings, through getting users to be more creative in their 
use of funds’ (Needham, 2010, p136). Local authorities may therefore exert pressure on 
care managers to increase numbers of people on Direct Payments, which may lead to 
increased risk and some individuals struggling to organise and manage care. Lloyd (2010) 
argues that such consequences arise from an individualistic conception of choice and 
control, rather than acknowledging the centrality of relationships and an ethic of care.  
 
A distinction is often made  between ‘person-centred care’, meaning providing choice and 
control for individuals, and ‘personalisation’, representing the policy focus on Resource 
Allocation Systems, Personal Budgets and marketisation (Beresford et al, 2011; Woolham et 
al, 2015). The development of Direct Payments can be seen as part of a greater transfer of 
responsibility and risk from the state to the service user for the choices they make and their 
consequences (Ferguson, 2007). This paper examines some of the implications of this 
development of ‘responsibilisation’, reflecting neo-liberal theory where individuals are seen 
as self-directing and autonomous (Bondi, 2005, Clarke et al, 2007), in the context of risk and 
safeguarding imperatives. 
 
There is little research on the impact of personalisation on safeguarding practice (for 
exceptions, see Manthorpe et al 2009; Hunter et al 2013). This paper presents findings from 
a qualitative interview study that sought professionals' perspectives, experiences and 
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responses to balancing the sometimes conflicting demands of personalisation and 
safeguarding. Interviews were undertaken as part of a recently completed study that aimed 
to identify the impact of Direct Payments and personal budgets on safeguarding referrals 
and to explore practice approaches to managing risks in supporting people to use Direct 
Payments and personal budgets safely. The study explored the speculative concerns raised 
by local authority and other professionals in the context of earlier opinions and debates, 
such as views about personalisation improving or jeopardising safeguarding (Poll et al. 2005; 
Williams 2010; Warin 2010; Richards and Ogilvie, 2010), which has been also highlighted by 
users and carers (Anonymous 2008; James 2008; Jupp 2008) and contributors to the 
government’s review of the policy guidance on adult safeguarding, No Secrets (DH 2010b). 
 
Findings from interviews with professionals are presented and discussed in light of the 
themes raised in the literature, such as: the benefits and risks of self-directed support 
(Hunter et al, 2013); the power relationships implicit in Direct Payments (Leece, 2010); and 
the reported reluctance of some groups to report potentially abusive or neglectful care 
provided by family carers (Bowes et al. 2008). It concludes by discussing the degree of 
convergence between personalisation and safeguarding, which the earlier evaluation of 
Individual Budgets identified as initially operating largely on ‘parallel tracks’ (Manthorpe et 
al., 2009) and which potentially remains a contested area of practice (Schwehr 2010; SCIE 
2010).   
The benefits and risks of personalisation 
There is a substantial international literature on the use of personalised care models, which 
involve the monetising of need and individualised purchasing of support (Manthorpe et al. 
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2014) although eligibility may be restricted by impairment or age. In England, the currently 
dominant cash-for-care model is personal budgets, as recently confirmed by the Care Act 
2014. These offer eligible individuals increased control over the use of allocated money. 
They can be deployed in different ways: as a Direct Payment, where service users entirely or 
partly manage their  personal budget as a Direct Payment; paid to a third party (an ‘indirect 
payment’), usually a family member, who manages the budget on behalf of the individual; 
or wholly managed by a care manager or social worker, which is known as a managed 
Personal Budget, which some have argued offers only ‘minor increases in opportunities for 
personalisation and choice’ (Rabiee et al, 2013: p3). It is the government’s intention that 
Direct Payments become the main form of deployment of personal budgets (DH 2010a).  
 
There is much evidence about the positive impact of Direct Payments for certain groups of 
people, although similar evidence has not been found for managed personal budgets 
(Slasberg and Beresford, 2015). Outcomes for older people have been found to be less 
positive than for others (Netten et al., 2012). However, take up of Direct Payments remains 
low, especially amongst older people; only 15 per cent of older people receiving publicly 
funded social care take up a Direct Payment (ADASS, 2014).   
 
Manthorpe et al. (2009) found that many practitioners and managers had concerns about 
the negative consequences of Individual Budgets (the precursor to personal budgets) for 
some people. Fears were expressed that using unregulated care workers or relatives may 
leave disabled or older people at greater risk of abuse (including neglect, physical and 
financial abuse/exploitation) or of receiving poorer quality support than people in receipt of 
conventional regulated services. Such fears are widely shared (Leece, 2010; Ferguson, 
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2007). Direct Payment holders are permitted to pay relatives (who live outside the home) to 
provide care and support and relatives are able to act as proxies by holding the Direct 
Payment when the adult concerned is not able to do so, for reasons such as severe 
dementia. Both of these developments may increase vulnerability to financial and other 
forms of abuse, as adult safeguarding managers have warned (Manthorpe and Samsi, 2013). 
Earlier research, however, suggests that people using Direct Payments and employing 
Personal Assistants (PAs) may report less abuse or poor quality care than those using 
conventional, council-commissioned services (Adams and Godwin, 2008), although this may 
be due more to low reporting levels rather than an indication of less abuse. Furthermore, 
some commentators have proposed that safeguarding is enhanced by greater choice and 
control (Tyson, 2010). 
 
Methods and data 
The study took place from 2012 to 2014. It involved a review of Safeguarding Adults Boards’ 
Annual Reports (Manthorpe et al, 2015), analysis of national and local data and interviews 
with professionals and service users. The study’s findings are reported in Stevens et al 
(2015).  
 
This paper draws on semi-structured interviews with professionals working in three selected 
English local authorities. The three sites were chosen to represent different types and size of 
authority: one Metropolitan borough, one rural Shire county and one city council. Two had 
specialist safeguarding teams that undertook some or all safeguarding work. In the third site 
responses to safeguarding concerns were undertaken by any social worker. The size of the 
sites’ general population’s ranged from 200,000 – 500,000.  
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We interviewed 14 professionals (six social workers, five team managers and three senior 
managers) and two elected council members. Of these participants, only social workers 
have regular extended contact with service users, undertaking assessments and reviews. 
Team managers may have occasional contact, possibly only in resolving problems or in 
relation to safeguarding referrals. Senior managers have less contact still, again mainly when 
chairing meetings or possibly through consultative activities in relation to policy and 
practice (which may also be attended by elected members). 
To preserve anonymity, quotations from the elected members have been labelled as ‘Senior 
Managers’, in the Findings Section. Table 1 presents some demographic details about sites 
and participants. While there was a mix of gender, we will refer to all participants as ‘she’ in 
order to protect anonymity; the names of the LA sites are not reported as a further 
assurance. Other possibly identifying characteristics have also been disguised. 
 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants before interviews. The interviews 
sought views about the potential risks and opportunities of personal budgets and Direct 
Payments and the extent to which safeguarding was considered and if necessary addressed 
within support plans. Details about the link between safeguarding and personalisation 
practice were also explored. The interview guides are available from the authors. All 
interviews were digitally audio-recorded and fully transcribed.  
 
Analysis was undertaken with the aid of the computerised qualitative data analysis software 
NVIVO. We used Framework analysis (Gale et al. 2013) as the method of analysis, which 
enabled summarising of data from each source prior to analysis by type/characteristics of 
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study participants as well as by themes, both those derived from previous research findings 
and those emerging from the study.  
 
Table 1 Research participants 
Type of professional 
Site 
Total 1 2 3 
Senior 
manager/elected 
member 
2 2 1 5 
Social worker 3 2 1 6 
Team manager   5 5 
Total 5 4 7 16 
 
 
Findings 
Five main themes emerged from our analysis: contexts and risk factors; views about  risks 
associated with Direct Payments; approaches to minimising risk; balancing risk and choice; 
and weaving safeguarding and personalisation practice.  
 
Contexts and risk factors 
Public spending constraints were perceived by many participants as important factors in 
creating a more risky context for personalisation. Reductions in services or to budgets were 
believed by some to increase risk through exacerbating unmet needs among care users, 
potentially lower quality services (arising from a view that care providers were being paid 
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less to provide the same service, resulting in lower standards) and higher eligibility criteria. 
However, the two elected members were less critical of cuts being made. 
 
More generally, poverty was widely identified by participants as an important factor in 
relation to abuse. One senior manager suggested that this might create a risk as the Direct 
Payment would become an apparently necessary part of the family income and it might be 
difficult to ensure it was used by the person for whom it was intended. One social worker 
specifically identified poverty as a risk factor, citing the recent financial downturn as 
creating the circumstances in which Personal Assistants (PAs, including family members 
employed as PAs), might engage in abusive behaviour: 
 
I think, there were lots of cases to be honest, where people are doing things 
to people, bad things, that ordinarily they may not do if they weren’t quite so 
desperate themselves. 
Social Worker 09 
 
The degree to which personalisation had been embedded within a local authority was 
another important aspect of the context within which social workers practiced. The advent 
of personal budgets was felt to have offered a wider variety of ways of arranging support in 
addition to Direct Payments, including pooled budgets and legal trusts. Several dimensions 
were identified. First was the ability to choose from a wider range of services: most 
participants reported that all people who met the eligibility criteria were offered a Direct 
Payment. However, safeguarding concerns were sometimes given as a reason not to offer 
one: 
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You’ll be aware that really we have to offer a Direct Payment, unless there’s a 
safeguarding reason not to. 
Senior Manager 05 
 
How personalisation was being implemented locally was another important contextual 
factor. In each of the sites, participants expressed commitment to promoting person-
centred services that promoted choice and control; indeed these were seen as an 
expression of social work values. There was a simultaneous perception that the focus on 
personal budgets reflected market-driven approaches that were designed to reduce the size 
of the public sector. This comment by a team manager typifies this tension:  
 
I think that social work values are really linked into being personalised and 
person-centred, but I think that personalisation is interpreted in a lot of 
different ways by social workers. I think...some social workers really embrace 
it and adopt it as part of social work. I’m probably a little bit more sceptical, I 
sort of see a more politicised version of it and, about sort of market forces. 
 Team Manager 11 
It was therefore unsurprising that participants expressed varying opinions about the impact 
of personalisation on risks of abuse and neglect. At times, this could lead to the same 
participant suggesting that Direct Payments were both increasing and reducing such risks, 
depending on context. We encountered many of the similar anticipatory fears reported by 
Manthorpe et al (2009) in the national evaluation of Individual Budgets (the IBSEN study). In 
this present study, however, these fears were set in the context of practice experience. 
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Three participants reported experiences of Direct Payment users being at greater risk of 
financial abuse and exploitation from family members in the context of personalisation, 
whether users were managing a Direct Payment themselves or not. 
 
A small number of social workers described the level of monitoring of Direct Payments as 
being less intensive in the current context and felt this increased risk of harm because 
problems may have gone unnoticed. One felt that, as a consequence of increased flexibility 
over ’personalised’ social care, care accessed or arranged by Direct Payment users was more 
difficult to monitor than in-house arranged or provided services: 
 
Yes, quite possibly [there is increased risk], because when you have a 
conventional home care service, it kind of does what it says on the tin. You 
know, half an hour here and there. You’ll put your tasks down, that sorts that 
out. You know, tasks on the care plan or support plan, whatever it’s called 
these days. With somebody with a Direct Payment, you’ve got all sorts of 
other things that you need to consider. 
Social Worker 09 
 
Only two participants mentioned increased risks from the employment of unregulated PAs, 
which were more commonly raised as concerns  in the IBSEN study. However, participants 
emphasised the challenges that being an employer could pose for Direct Payment users. 
They referred to difficulties related to blurred boundaries arising from budget holders 
employing friends and family members. Social workers’ lack of knowledge of who was being 
employed as a person’s PA was also cited as a potential area of concern:  
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It could be anybody. The risk is: who are they employing? What experience do 
these people [PAs] have? 
Team Manager 01 
 
Seven participants perceived an increased risk when Direct Payments were managed by a 
third party such as a family member  However, one case was described where a social care 
provider, operating as a sole trader, was effectively offering a case management service, but 
was defrauding service users by not providing the service promised. Another case was 
reported where an unknown individual had offered care management services, paid for 
through a Direct Payment, which had caused concern. The main risks identified were 
financial exploitation and the person not getting the care or support services they needed. 
This social worker summed up such concerns: 
 
I think people are more at risk of exploitation. I’m not saying that they don’t 
have a right to take that risk, but I think things will be missed. That’s my 
concern, that professionals won’t always be aware of what’s going on, 
especially in some of the cases where I’ve worked with family members who 
are exploiting the individual. Then it’s actually, they’re not getting more 
choice and control, they’re getting less. 
Social worker 08 
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Views on risks associated with Direct Payments  
Five participants argued that Direct Payments would be a way to reduce the risk of harm. 
They attributed this to the increased control Direct Payments could give to people. Four of 
these were managers who suggested that Direct Payments might reduce risk primarily 
because of increased choice and control, but also because Direct Payment users were more 
likely to be supported in the community: 
 
I think that the evidence, I think the evidence that I’ve seen shows that where 
people feel more in control of their lives they are more likely to be able to 
keep themselves safe. 
Team Manager 11 
 
However, another manager suggested that individuals using personal budgets may not 
always be in a good position to exercise control, because of the imbalance in power 
relationships between themselves and local authorities, and the questions about the 
availability of alternative providers of support. Glendinning (2008) argued that the increased 
potential for choice offered by Individual Budgets and Direct Payments would be likely to be 
limited by contextual factors such as resources, ability and strength of family networks; a 
view similarly expressed by a senior manager:   
 
I do believe that if you take a Personal Budget, you actually have more control 
over the decision making. It doesn’t necessarily mean that you are in a 
personally strong situation where you can say, ‘Actually, I don’t want it 
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anymore because I don’t feel safe.’ But I would hope that you at least have a 
say in what you have. 
Senior manager 06 
 
In contrast, six participants thought that Direct Payments represented similar levels and 
types of risks as previous arrangements, or that any difference in risk was unknown or 
unknowable. These participants also reflected on the risk of abuse by regulated home care 
workers who regularly spent less time than contracted with the service user. For example, a 
team manager felt that Direct Payments holders were likely to suffer the full range of abuse:  
 
There’s a real range, you know, from, financial and material exploitation or 
abuse, through to physical, sexual, acts of neglect. There’s various cases that 
are kind of popping into my brain now as I’m talking about, which really 
reflect the whole spectrum of types of exploitation or harm. 
Team Manager 10 
Approaches to minimise risk 
Many different interventions were discussed by social workers and managers as a response 
to concerns about risk of harm in relation to the use of Direct Payments. These included not 
offering Direct Payments, or rescinding a Direct Payment when there were serious concerns 
about safety. As one senior manager put it: ‘So it’s choice as long as we agree with your 
choice’ (Senior manager 01). However, in contrast, one team manager also said that a Direct 
Payment could be introduced as a response to a risky situation, possibly as the only means 
of engaging with someone with very specific kinds of need. Other ways of managing risk 
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included allowing only part of the personal budget to be taken as a Direct Payment and 
increased monitoring through the involvement of other agencies providing treatment and 
support, such as NHS community nurses.  
 
Three managers and social workers described situations where relatives, companies or user-
led organisations acted as third parties or offered an unofficial care management service. 
This was felt to provide additional protection by supporting the individual to make good 
decisions about using their Direct Payment. Where such arrangements were made, one 
senior manager described the legal safeguards required, such as a confirmation that the 
relative was a ‘suitable person’ to manage the Direct Payment on their behalf, which may 
provide some safeguards: 
 
If we are satisfied that we believe the person can manage the direct payment 
or a relative can manage it for them, and that relative appears to be suitable, 
then we will allow the direct payment to go ahead. And that’s just part of 
general practice.   
Senior manager 05 
 
However, problems with these processes and support planning have been reported 
(Laybourne, et al., 2014).  
 
The importance of monitoring and reviews to identify potential risks of abuse and harm was 
mentioned by most participants. They suggested that this was more necessary when Direct 
Payments were involved. For example, some participants emphasised the potential of 
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financial monitoring as a useful trigger for further investigation. These could be initiated if 
people using Direct Payments did not send their monitoring reports to the local authority 
for long periods, or if something untoward appeared in the reports, for instance how the 
budget had been spent. As an example, one social worker described how a financial report 
had identified that a Direct Payment user had used up their entire budget, which meant 
they had no money to cover annual leave costs and replacement care or to meet 
contingencies, which raised wider concerns about what was happening.  
 
Two participants specifically mentioned recommendations that their local authority made to 
prospective Direct Payment users to help minimise risk. These related to vetting potential 
PAs to check if they had a criminal record or were barred from similar work. However, 
despite the descriptions of leaflets, factsheets, web information and direct advice, one 
social worker commented that people using Direct Payments (or family carers or friends) 
learned about what to do if something went wrong by ‘word of mouth’ (Social Worker 11). 
No participants mentioned providing individuals with information about any specific risks 
associated with taking up a Direct Payment before a particular arrangement was agreed. 
This may have been because of pressure to achieve local targets for Personal Budgets, and a 
desire not to discourage Direct Payment take-up.   
Balancing risk and choice 
Balancing risk and choice emerged as a strong theme from participants’ accounts. Two 
specific aspects were identified: changes in relationships with Direct Payment and personal 
budget holders about risk management; and positive risk taking.  
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Changing relationships with Direct Payment and personal budget holders  
A range of perspectives about responsibilities for managing risk emerged in the interviews 
with the social workers and managers. Almost all stressed that the local authority had a 
responsibility to ensure that people receiving a Direct Payment remained safe. There was 
strong acceptance that greater individual responsibility for risk was inevitable and indeed, a 
positive consequence of increasing choice and control. However participants described 
having to balance the task of promoting autonomy with a duty of care, suggesting that the 
transfer of risk was only partial. Practitioners expressed a continuing sense of responsibility 
for people’s safety or wellbeing, whether or not the individual had decision making capacity 
and/or was in receipt of Direct Payments. Several linked this concern with the fact that 
Direct Payments were public money:   
 
I think we need to be quite careful of having an attitude where we say quite 
blithely that people have a right to make unwise decisions. That is never going 
to remove the duty of care for [a] local authority where people are putting 
themselves in a position of harm and the fact that people are deemed to have 
capacity can sometimes give professionals, and sometimes local authorities, a 
seeming ‘carte blanche’ to remove themselves from any responsibility in that 
person’s life, where they are, where they are making unwise decisions and 
putting themselves at considerable risk. 
Team Manager 10 
 
Five participants also considered that the management of Direct Payments could be 
burdensome for the budget holder. Elements that created burden included the intensive 
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responsibility of  managing care for a spouse. As well as adding to pre-existing care tasks, 
responsibilities for training PAs or for employing staff were sometimes daunting for spouse 
carers and others: 
 
You see their faces change when people start saying, ‘well actually, you’ll be 
the employer’, they’ll go, ‘what do you mean? I don’t want to be an 
employer’, you know. ‘I worked in a factory all me life…’ 
Social Worker 05 
 
However, two social workers believed that many people were well placed to make good and 
safe decisions about their use of personal budgets and Direct Payments. This balance of 
approaches was summed up by one senior manager, who talked about the need to offer 
service users the same safeguards as those for people using commissioned services, whilst 
ensuring Direct Payment users maintained control: 
 
So it’s putting in place those safeguards that, that we would have for any 
commissioned services, and, and not forcing it on people but giving them the 
access to those sorts of, of assurances that we would put in place. 
Senior Manager 11 
 
Positive risk taking 
For practitioners, the nub of decision making about risks appeared to be in balancing the 
likelihood of potentially positive benefits to be gained, such as self-determination, a valued 
relationship and choice of particular provider, against the likelihood and relative severity of 
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harm. Illustrations provided by participants included situations where individuals with 
decision-making capacity, or possibly where there were doubts about capacity, chose to pay 
individuals to provide them with physical care and where concerns emerged about some 
kind of emotional or financial abuse. For example, one social worker described a case she 
classed as problematic in which a man was very keen to be supported by particular PAs, but 
there were concerns that they might have been harming him:   
 
But this gentleman was crystal clear, that he wanted these two people to 
provide the support as PAs rather than having the conventional care package 
that he’d had for a little while. And I thought, okay, this is potentially risky, 
you know, we have a referral about these people. 
Social worker 07 
 
Despite the differences in relationships noted above, four managers and social workers 
reiterated the view that ‘old fashioned social work’, related to ‘care and control’ (Team 
Manager 03), was needed. In other words, they felt that the approach needed currently was 
not fundamentally different from social work before the implementation of personalisation 
policies. Additionally, the processes involved in agreeing whatever support was planned 
often involved management oversight, keeping another element of control within the local 
authority:  
 
So I think it’s an interesting area about how you deal with, I don’t know if, if 
risk is about, it’s about conflict sometimes, difference, difference of opinion 
and different view, and that’s, yeah, it’s a bit of good old-fashioned social 
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work, isn’t it really? You know, working with people to come to, you know, a 
consensus and a view. 
Team Manager 12 
 
Weaving safeguarding and personalisation practice 
Providing information about managing a Direct Payment and various risks was one of the 
strongest themes from practitioners once the decision about how to manage personal 
budgets was made. Information about personal budgets and safeguarding (mainly 
describing how to avoid financial exploitation) tended to be given after the initial 
assessments of eligibility and financial circumstances had been completed rather than at 
first contact 
 
One senior manager, for example, described how safeguarding information, or at least 
information about risk management, was given after a safeguarding concern had been 
raised:  
 
I know that once it gets to the point of looking like it might be, for example, a 
safeguarding issue; some initial advice is given then before passing it to the 
relevant social work team to take forward further.  
Senior Manager 07 
 
In all sites, there was evidence that safeguarding concerns were being woven into 
personalisation practice (‘safeguarding is everyone’s business’ Senior Manager 01), although 
formal crossover of responsibility was at service manager level or above. However, in one of 
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the sites that had a specialist safeguarding team, there was some concern that this might 
distort the practice of operational social work team members, who found ways to triage and 
not refer less serious concerns. Risks were assessed at many points in the process and 
through different types of work. Support planning appeared to be the part of the process 
whereby risks more relevant to safeguarding were identified and plans drawn up to 
minimise or ameliorate them. Alternatively, support plans explicitly recorded risky decisions 
being taken by service users. Participants thought that initial assessments tended to focus 
on more generic risks, such as falling: 
 
So, at that point it is the more generic risks, not the risks associated with, say, 
having a personal assistant via Direct Payment. ... at the point of support 
planning, then you're getting into that discussion with the person about how 
they want their care delivered, and that would start to get into the arena of 
how [to address safeguarding risks] 
Senior Manager 07 
Safeguarding process 
In the main, the safeguarding process was reported as similar for all service users, regardless 
of whether they received Direct Payments or commissioned care services: 
  
I don’t think it’s changed the standard, and the guidance, and the policy that 
much, but I think it has, by nature, raised the awareness of staff to look out 
for different things in different situations. 
Senior Manager 07 
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They also noted that Direct Payment users rarely reported abuse. Some suggested that 
family carers should be made aware of what constitutes acceptable staff behaviour and 
inappropriate behaviour so that they can identify unsafe and poor care. However, because 
of the different kinds of relationships involved with Direct Payments, the content and focus 
of discussions may differ when discussing care quality. The ability of Direct Payment users to 
choose whom they employ potentially creates a double standard, given the requirements 
that apply to staff working for regulated providers where training and pre-employment 
checks for criminal convictions are requirements. 
 
One social worker described how the safeguarding team and learning disability care 
management team worked together on more complex cases in their local authority. She 
stressed the importance of particular circumstances in determining the relationship 
between safeguarding and support planning. For example, financial abuse may have little to 
do with care needs; therefore a safeguarding plan may focus on distinct elements: 
 
Sometimes they [Support plan and Safeguarding plan] are inextricably linked 
and you can’t separate them but there are other times where people have 
got, maybe there’s an incident of financial abuse, but it doesn’t really link 
with their care needs.  
Social Worker 08 
 
Some participants felt that safeguarding planning was complicated because specialist 
safeguarding social workers were usually not in a position to commission new services for 
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individuals. This meant fresh arrangements were needed when a safeguarding plan required 
new services. However,, if the protection or safeguarding plan involved setting up an 
appointee to manage a service user’s finances (benefits and/or pensions) as the only 
element of the safeguarding plan, an operational social worker was not needed to do this: 
 
Again, it’s being proportionate and reasonable. It doesn’t seem proportionate 
to pass it on to a social worker to do a full self-directed support plan. We’ve 
got all that information and all we’re asking for is a very small service to 
manage the risk. 
Social Worker 08 
Discussion and conclusion 
Other recent studies exploring safeguarding and personalisation have concentrated on 
safeguarding practitioners (Manthorpe and Samsi, 2013). Our findings suggest changes in 
approach and a reworking of traditional relationships between social workers (who, in our 
study, continued to be the main professionals involved) and people using services. Many of 
our findings explore tensions in policy and practice. While findings from interviews with 
service users (Stevens et al, 2015) complement the themes identified here, more research is 
needed in order thoroughly to explore in these tensions and to identify nuances in how they 
are manifested. 
 
As noted in the introduction, some commentators (Clarke et al 2007; Ferguson, 2007; 
Scourfield, 2007) have pointed to the increased focus on individualisation as transfer of risks 
from the state to the individual. For example, Ferguson (2007) argues that the programme 
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of personalisation started by the New Labour government, and continued by the Coalition 
government, resulted in a major transfer of risks from the state to the individual, along with 
greater focus on individualised services and the emphasis on individual responsibility for 
wellbeing. Like other aspects of personalisation, this has been perceived as both  
empowering and as ‘radical individualism’ (Burton and Kagan, 2006: 302), emphasising the 
individual rather than the social as the locus of responsibility. More ‘able’ individuals and 
those with access to greater financial and human resources (in the form of human capital) 
seem better able to make the most of this increased choice, thereby leading to better 
outcomes. As Clarke et al. (2007) argues: 
 
Inequalities of wealth and income, and of cultural and social capital, affect 
both the range of choice available and the ability to make desired outcomes 
materialise. (Clarke et al, 2007: 249) 
 
Users of publicly funded social care services tend to be among the poorest, which means 
they may find it difficult to make the most of the anticipated effect of choice and control. 
They may lack support to make the best decisions, or choices may indeed be limited. There 
was some discussion in the interviews about the extent to which people can exercise choice, 
or are merely given theoretical choice. This was felt to be relevant to the degree to which 
use of Direct Payments could improve service users’ abilities to keep themselves safe. For 
example, the combination of high eligibility criteria and stringent financial assessments may 
mean that some people with needs for care and support get small or no budgets at all, thus 
making it much harder to exercise choice. A similar distinction has been drawn in 
community development, between psychological and political empowerment (Sadan, 2004). 
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Psychological empowerment reflects individual ability and confidence to make decisions. 
Political empowerment requires the existence of the right kinds of societal support to 
execute decisions made. This distinction seems especially apposite for safeguarding 
situations, which may affect both an individual’s ability to take, or more importantly 
implement, decisions. For example, if PAs or family members consistently undermine a 
service user’s confidence this will limit their ability to make and implement choices. 
 
While individualisation may be helpful conceptually in discussing the primacy of choice and 
control, our findings suggest that the concept of responsibilisation may be more fruitful in 
analysing the interface of personalisation and adult safeguarding for practitioners. Our 
findings further conclude that the importance of being ‘responsible’ is not solely applicable 
to service users but applies to practitioners and managers who see their role as being 
responsible for spending public money, for the wellbeing and safety of vulnerable adults, 
and for promoting effective safeguarding measures. The idea of responsibilisation is seen by 
Roulstone and Morgan (2009) as distorting the aims of self-direction and management, 
allowing for a more victim blaming discourse. As Lewis and West (2014) argue, the tension 
that sometimes exists between established standards of quality and the choices that are 
made by Direct Payment users, can create an added problem in managing risk. They further 
point out that the decrease in public funds available for adult social care creates an added 
problem for Direct Payment users in securing sufficiently high quality care, another factor 
likely to affect safety and wellbeing. 
 
From this study of the perspectives of social workers and their managers it appears that 
they are reconciling possibly competing policy objectives and adapting their role 
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accordingly. The professional participants appeared to be wrestling with a new emphasis on 
autonomy, while retaining a strong sense of duty of care, reflecting the tensions identified 
by older people participating in Leece and Leece’s (2011) study. This appears to have strong 
echoes of the well-known and longstanding tensions between care and control (Parton, 
2000) or protection and autonomy (Stevenson, 1993). This study suggests the importance 
developments in the balance of emphasis in these kinds of tensions, which may underlie 
practitioners’ enduring fears about risk, desire to maintain monitoring and to constrain care 
choices.   
 
This exemplifies the argument made by Stevens et al. (2011) that there are multiple 
motivations behind personalisation. First, the goals of the disability movement in increasing 
self-realisation and autonomy through greater choice and control, which were seen as 
closely aligned to professional aspirations, but second, a desire to reduce the public sector 
and implement market-driven solutions were less broadly supported by practitioners. There 
is increasing concern about the dominance of a neoliberal standpoint, driving the focus on 
reducing public spending, increasing marketisation and privileging  individualism over 
collectivism (Ferguson, 2012).  
 
Participants identified concerns about the invisibility of abuse among Direct Payment users, 
as well as a desire to instigate ‘normal safeguards’. Our study suggests that social workers 
continue to exercise discretion as ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Ellis, 2007, citing Lipsky, 1980) 
and thereby affect policy implementation. This arises from the limited scope they retain to 
decide whether or not to offer a prospective service user a Direct Payment or to offer a 
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‘partial’ Direct Payment, as well as their possible discretion over the way they decide to 
work with individuals to manage identified risks and set in place monitoring requirements.  
 
However, social workers are responsible for implementing safeguarding policy and 
procedures. The Care Act 2014 creates a duty, for the first time, on local authorities to 
undertake inquiries where there are safeguarding concerns. While this is mainly 
strengthening existing policy, rather than being a new duty or power, the symbolism of a 
statutory requirement is important. It sends a strong message about professional roles. 
Consequently, social workers are working across policies that appear still to be in tension, as 
Manthorpe et al. (2009) noted. This may allow more space for discretion in implementation, 
particularly as a result of increasing public unease about cases where concerns were 
unaddressed, for example, the Stephen Hoskin serious case review (Flynn, 2009). The 
mantra that ‘safeguarding is everybody’s business’ (Dunn et al. 2009) adds to this sense that 
all social workers, whether directly involved in safeguarding or not, have a responsibility to 
minimise risk of harm, even where people have capacity to make decisions including 
decisions seen as risky or unwise. Further research may point to practice solutions, to such 
dilemmas. 
 
Limitations of this study  
This study was limited in scale and scope. It took place in three sites and whilst these 
reflected differences in type of authority, geographical location and local demography, they 
are unlikely to be representative of all English authorities. The small number of participants 
may have had strong opinions which may or may not have been typical and they may not 
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have had substantial experience of Direct Payment and safeguarding practice. Nonetheless, 
this research, building on previous studies, especially the IBSEN study completed in 2008 
when practice and provision of Direct Payments were still unclear, provides up-to-date rich 
data about social workers’ experience and views about personalisation and safeguarding 
practice.  
Conclusion  
This study suggests that social workers and managers are more aware of the links between 
safeguarding and personalisation practice than Manthorpe et al. (2009) found at the time of 
the Individual Budgets pilots in 2006-08. It also identifies a continuing tension between 
these policy objectives in practice. However, this tension is inherent in social work practice, 
requiring practitioners to engage with a new form of the familiar balance between ‘care and 
control’ (Weinberg, 2014). Managing this new balance may require reorientation of 
practice, as practitioners negotiate the potentially divergent requirements to promote 
autonomy, whilst remaining responsible for safeguarding. This suggests a need for training 
or skills development, good supervision and official acknowledgement of the tensions that 
social workers are managing. Overall, the study supports the continued need for skilled 
professional involvement in personalised social care and safeguarding, given the complexity 
of some of the judgements that need to be made, especially in interpreting the relative 
importance of family dynamics and other relationships as pointers to potential abuse. 
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